The present study is to point out the outcomes of the Seminar on the Chemical Weapon Convention 
Introduction
Large inventories of hazardous chemicals which can cause catastrophic consequences if released maliciously, the presence of chemical agents which can be stolen and be used either in later terrorist attacks or in making chemical and biochemical weapons, along with the key role of chemical plants in the economy and the public welfare and as an integral element in the supply chain have made the security of chemical plants a great concern especially since 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Aside from the importance of chemical plants themselves as potentially attractive targets to terrorist attacks, the usage of chemicals in more than half of the terrorist attacks worldwide (Figure 1 ) further emphasizes the security assessment and management of chemical plants. (Table 1 ). Yet, the risk of terrorist attacks should not be underestimated by authorities and plants' owners and security management; recent attacks to two chemical facilities in Figure 2 (a), where the security parameters are hierarchically scoring in a top-down fashion starting from asset identification and consequence analysis in the first step, threat assessment and attractiveness analysis in the second step, the vulnerability assessment in the third step, and so on. As a result of such linear approach to security risk assessment, for one thing, the impact of a plant's vulnerability cannot be taken into account in assessing the attractiveness of the plant since the former is performed after the latter (see Figure 2 (a)). However, as can be seen in Figure 2 (b), the vulnerability should play a role in attractiveness analysis as the more vulnerable a chemical plant the more attractive it could be to the eyes of even less-equipped terrorists.
(a) (b)
Step 1: Characterization Analyze assets and criticality, screen assets on consequences
Step 2: Threat assessment Analyze threats and asset attractiveness and determine target assets
Step 3: Vulnerability assessment
Conduct scenario analysis, determine act-specific consequences and vulnerability The overlook of the mutual interactions of this kind can undermine the reliability and validity of the security risk assessment. Inspired by CCPS and API methodologies and irrespective of the adopted technique for security assessment -whether attack tree or Bayesian network -most of the developed methodologies since 2003 can be criticized of the same hierarchical approach to security risk assessment. To address this issue, the applicability of techniques such as systems thinking, analytic network process (a multi-criteria decision making technique) and Petri nets which facilitates the feedbacks (mutual interaction), loops, and non-linear analysis can be examined. Instilling a "chemical conscience" to chemical professionals will not only mitigate insiderinvolvement security breaches, but also help ensure that these workers will do their jobs to the best of their abilities, keeping in mind the effect of their practice to the company, their community, and the environment. This will make ethics in the practice of chemistry a vital component in the design and administration of educational and awareness activities pertaining to chemical safety and security.
Threat
Also, the sequence of topics at which chemical safety and security is taught can be beneficial to the learning process. Chemical safety concepts, which encompasses knowledge on chemical reactivity, chemical value, appropriate chemical storage, and chemical transport is best taught prior to security concepts, as this will dictate on how security measures in a chemical plant are designed [1] . A simple example is the need for knowledge on chemical reactivity to determine whether a chemical is attractive to non-state actors before appropriate access controls can be chosen, or decide on where to store the chemical in a graded protection system of security control. Chemical safety therefore walks hand-in-hand with, but perhaps a step ahead of, security, in ensuring the overall hygiene of specific risk management measures employed in a chemical plant. Perhaps, the same sequence of concepts should be applied when it in comes to teaching CSS.
In this section, a special course -Chemistry 359 -offered in the Institute of Chemistry at University of the Philippines-Diliman on chemical safety and security will be discussed as an example of an activity, which can be categorized under education and training in security risk management. The example includes the design of the syllabus and topics, sequence of topics, as well as the kind of tools employed for student performance assessment. The dual-use of chemistry, which looks at specific chemicals with multiple uses, and may have possible nefarious applications such as warfare and substance abuse were also included in this segment [3, 4] Award-winning scientists with checkered reputations such as Fritz Haber were talked about in class, emphasizing the need for ethics in the practice of chemistry, for it to be beneficial to humanity [5] . It was also made clear that the intention of the practitioner is everything, and will decide whether chemistry becomes a friend or foe. The philosophy behind the science of chemistry and its practice was also included, even looking at the nature of the science itself [6] .
As an output for this topic, the students were expected to write a report on the dual-use of chemistry on a chemical of their choosing. The report included the history of the compound chosen, such as how it was discovered, reactions that the chemical may undergo for it to become hazardous, events on when the compound was used nefariously, and laws that govern the use of the compound.
Chemical safety was discussed before chemical security to rehash the students on their safety knowledge taken during their undergraduate laboratory courses. This was also deemed necessary for the students to understand better chemical security. This specific topic involved laboratory safety such as PPE, chemical compatibilities for proper storage, chemical safety logos and labels, chemical spill management, and pollution prevention and waste minimization [7] . Emergency safety placements were also emphasized such as "buddy system" and "safety network". Chemical security on the other hand, was focused on physical protection, transport management, and cyber security. The materials used for discussion were mostly taken from the modules prepared by Sandia National Laboratories under the Chemical Security Program of the United States of America
For safety risk assessment, only qualitative assessments were studied such as HAZOP, WHAT-IF analysis, and the basic risk equation due to the lack of expert in the institute. Models such as the Swiss cheese model and layer of protection model were also discussed. The concept of a core group in charge of safety and security assessment was highlighted to instill in the students the need for cooperation. Also, constant re-assessment of in place measures was emphasized as key to the success of risk management plans. The students were asked to report on a specific article in the CWC and were asked to look for laws directly related to these articles, and the governing agencies responsible for the implementation of these laws in the Philippines. Another requirement on this segment was a report on case studies of actual plant disasters including cause analysis, and prevention analysis. The final examination was an online test on CSS using the developed web-based software eQChemSS of the OPCW [16] . Despite the increasing popularity amongst the scientific and non-scientific community, sharing information and knowledge dissemination related to risk assessment and management strategies, during workshops and seminars remain a complex and challenging task. It creates specific challenges as States Parties have adopted different risk management strategies to cater to their individual needs in diverse cultural settings. It has been evident that valuable resources have either been underutilized or duplicated, in the pursuit of developing better safety and security assessment tools.
Therefore, adhering to a common integrated safety and security risk management plan would enable a common solution to overcome national boundaries across diverse cultural settings. This seminar attempted to explicate the importance of a common safety and security risk assessment tool, which is accepted by Member States. And which would further provide systematic processes to understand the risk related to chemical industries. The objectives of the safety and security risk assessment programs are accomplished through sharing of case studies, table top exercises and group discussions. It explicitly defines the roles and responsibilities of professional risk management teams, and identifies results which could be leveraged for proper understanding of risk based safety and security assessment for Member States.
Data scarcity: application of precursors and data mining
Without a doubt, one of the most challenging parameters to estimate in security risk assessment is attack likelihood. A wide variety of factors should be taken into account in predicting the attack likelihood, including, but not limited to, (i) the general history of threats and attacks to similar targets -locally, regionally, nationally, and internationally -(ii) site-specific record of attacks, (iii) capability and potential actions of attackers (threats), (iv) motivation and intent of attackers, and (v) attractiveness of the chemical facility in the eyes of attackers, which in turn depends on a number of parameters the type of threat itself included (see the mutual interaction between "Threat" and "Attractiveness" in Figure 2(b) ).
Apart from the foregoing complexities in predicting the attack likelihood, the issue of data scarcity arising from the rarity of terrorist attacks to chemical facilities (Table 1) Re: Religious terrorist groups; Se: Separatist terrorist groups; En: Ethnic terrorist groups.
Inherently safer design techniques
The concept of Inherently Safety or Inherently Safer Design (ISD) was first introduced by Professor
Trevor Kletz (1922 Kletz ( -2013 following the Flixborough disaster in UK in 1974. "ISD is not a tool but a philosophy and way of thinking" (Dennis Hendershot, during a speech for CSB, reference + year?) which is aimed at eliminating the hazard instead of trying to control it or to mitigate the consequences. Kletz' famous quote "What you don't have, can't leak" have been interpreted via five themes: (i) minimization, (ii) substitution of hazardous materials and/or processes with less hazardous ones, (iii) moderation of process parameters such as temperature and pressure (iv) simplification of processes, and lately (v) moderation in terms of limitation of effects, via, for example, separation distances between critical units (e.g., storage area and control rooms).
The benefits of ISD in security risk assessment can be many folded. For instance, by minimizing or substituting hazardous materials, not only the attractiveness of chemical plants as a potential target is diminished but also in case of an attack the extent and severity of consequences would be minor.
Since security risk (SR) can be defined as a multiplicative function of threat (T), attractiveness (A), vulnerability (V), and consequences (C), SR= T. A. V. C 1 , a reduction in the attractiveness and consequences will result in a reduction of security risk.
Besides, through simplification of processes (e.g., neat and easy monitoring pipelines and valves), an intentional release of chemicals is much likelier to be noticed and followed by timely preventive and controlling measures. Similar beneficial attributes can be gained from limitation of effects where an intentional loss of containment and possible ensuing fire or explosion is less likely to escalate to secondary fire or explosions in neighboring units, initiating a domino effect.
Land use planning
Similar to ISD, land use planning (LUP) is a no-structural safety measure aimed at mitigating offsite consequences of major accidents by protecting people from exposure to dangerous doses generated by fire (heat radiation), explosion (overpressure), and especially dispersion of toxic materials (toxicity). In LUP, the land around either a major hazard installation such as a chemical facility or hazardous pipeline such as oil & gas pipeline is divided to zones usually based on the severity of potential consequences of possible accident scenarios (consequence-based LUP) or amounts of individual or societal risks (risk-based LUP). 
Chemical clusters
The challenges faced in the security risk assessment of ( No to mention that, in such a dynamic framework even safety precursor data such as accidental loss of containment, fires, or explosions can be used as indicators to infer the performance and efficiency of barriers, preparedness of employees and emergency response teams, and thus the vulnerability of the plant (and cluster) to intentional events. It is worth noting that the application of PDRA is not limited merely to chemical cluster but can be of great interest in individual chemical facilities as well.
Conclusions
We argue that physical security still has a long way to go in the chemical and process industry, and that the field is still in its puberty, in industrial practice. New paths need to be walked on by academia and by industrial practitioners since 9/11 since the world has profoundly changed -and is still changing -in terms of terrorism, interconnectedness of people, communication and social media, technological progress (e.g. drone technology), but also ethical and moral values (e.g. transparency, privacy) are becoming increasingly important. All these societal changes urge societies to think of innovative and intelligent ways to tackle security risks and this should be done in an adult way (e.g., how to solve the trade-off 'transparency-privacy').
Safety insights and progress can indeed be used to steer basic security progress, but more is needed.
The challenges and trends that we discussed in this paper show that security risk assessment and management in chemical plants can and should really take a leap forward in the near future, obviously preferably without the occurrence of major terrorist attack on a chemical industrial site in the Western world.
